New ISO specification for ETC systems

January 27, 2010

A newly published ISO Technical Specification harmonises the requirements for electronic fee collection (EFC) systems on roads subject to toll charges. It will facilitate mobility between different road networks and help to ensure reliable data collection and correct charging.

ISO/TS 12813:2009, “Electronic fee collection – Compliance check communication for autonomous systems”, will help to ensure the optimal use of on-board equipment (OBE) interfacing with satellite positioning to collect the data required for charging for the use of roads in an autonomous mode, without relying on dedicated road-side infrastructure.

The standard defines the requirements for using dedicated short range communication (DSRC) between on-board equipment and an interrogator for the purpose of checking compliance of road use with a local toll regime. This will enable checking of non-national vehicles and thus enable cross border enforcement of non-compliant vehicles.

The scope of the Electronic Fee Collection (EFC) standards relates to EFC charging systems and information exchanges over the interfaces. The standards focus on the interface between the on-board and the roadside equipment, but also deal with the ‘Information data flows between operators’. The standards primarily cover EFC systems based on Dedicated Short-Range Communication (DSRC); Cellular Network / Global Navigation Satellite Systems (CN/GNSS), and Integrated Circuit Card (ICC) technologies.

The standards suite includes not only ‘requirements’ but also associated test procedures, in order to support conformity evaluation of EFC on-board and roadside equipment. It also includes security guidelines that can be useful in the preparation or evaluation of security requirements.

ISO/TS 12813:2009, Electronic fee collection – Compliance check communication for autonomous systems, was jointly developed by ISO technical committee ISO/TC 204, Intelligent Transport systems and CEN/TC 278, Road transport and traffic telematics.

IVRCL Infra bullish on BOT road projects

January 27, 2010

IVRCL Infrastructure and Projects Ltd said it has received a Rs 1,550 crore BOT (Built Operate Transfer) road project in Madhya Pradesh from the National Highways Authority of India (NHAI). The concession will be for 25 years and the project will be completed in 30 months.

“The 155-km long road project will be executed by a special purpose vehicle owned by IVR Prime. The road construction will be taken up by IVRCL Infra,” said Mr E. Sudhir Reddy, the chairman of IVRCL Group.

“With this, IVR Prime has BOT projects — confirmed and lowest bidder — worth Rs 10,000 crore,” he said adding that the company expects to win six BOT projects by this year end.

The project, which is a part of National Highway 59, involves design, engineering, construction, development, finance, operation and maintenance of the road that runs between Indore and Ahmedabad.

Mr Reddy said that the debt-equity of 5:1 would be used to fund the project. “The equity component will be raised through internal accruals and raising debt will not be difficult for us,” Mr Reddy said.

Following the road transport and highways minister, Mr Kamal Nath’s target to build 20 km road every day by April 2010, the NHAI has put the process of awarding contracts on the fast track. “We are currently doing 9 km a day and would be in a position to scale up to 20 km a day by April-May 2010,” Mr Nath had said recently.

Recently, the government had approved road projects worth Rs 6,152 crore in five states for upgrading nearly 562 km of four-lane highways into six lanes.

Mr Nath had also coined the idea of issuing infrastructure bonds to raise money from non-resident Indians on the lines of the Resurgent India Bonds issued in 1998 and the India Millennium Bonds issued in 2000.

CCI approval for 561.89 km of highways in five states

January 11, 2010

On 9 January 2010, the Cabinet Committee on Infrastructure (CCI) approved road projects worth Rs 6,151.94 crore for upgrading nearly 561.89 km of highways in Maharashtra, Gujarat, Karnataka, Goa and Rajasthan.

The projects include expanding existing four-lane section roads into six-lanes of the Golden Quadrilateral (GQ) scheme in Maharashtra, Gujarat and Rajasthan (totalling 439.02 km). The projects include the 140.35-km Pune-Satara section on NH-4 in Maharashtra; the 56.16-km Samakhiali-Gandhidham section on NH-8A in Gujarat; and the 242.51-km Udaipur-Ahmedabad section on NH-8 in Rajasthan and Gujarat.

The GQ projects to be implemented on DBFOT basis are estimated to cost Rs 4,279.94 crore. While the concession period for the NH-4 and NH-8A projects is 24 years, the NH-8 project’s concession period is 30 years. All these projects have the construction period of 912 days.

Further, the CCI has accorded its approval for the implementation of the 122.87-km-long section of four/six-laning of Maharashtra/Goa border to Goa/Karnataka section of NH-17 in Goa on a DBFOT and BOT basis. The project cost is Rs 1,872 crore with a concession period of 23 years and construction period of 1,095 days.

Backward-bending policy to take toll

January 5, 2010

The B K Chaturvedi committee has suggested ways for expeditious financing and implementation of the National Highways Development Project (NHDP). It has rectified problematic rules concerning the exit policy, bid security, security to lenders, request for qualifications (RfQ) and request for proposal (RfP). These belated measures will surely make highway projects more attractive for investors.

However, some other recommendations bear unmistakable signs of fear psychosis, perhaps caused by the reduced private investment in highways during 2008-09. The decline was largely due to two reasons: the detrimental and mid-course changes made in RfQ and RfP rules, and the economic downturn. But in a typical panic-driven response, the committee has confused symptoms with the causes. Thus, it has introduced some questionable changes in the model concession agreement (MCA) for tolled projects. Conversely, several crucial issues have been ignored.

To put arguments in perspective, recall the pre-August 2008 scenario: 9%-plus growth rate, upbeat credit and financial markets, and bullish investors scrambling for projects to invest in. During 2006-07, more than 60 highway projects attracted private investment. In fact, there was a shortage of well-structured projects on offer.

The extant rules regarding the viability gap funding (VGF) and termination of contract posed no threat to the attractiveness of highway projects. Yet, the committee has targeted these rules to implement investors’ wishlist. Under a BOT-toll contract, an investor is granted the right to charge toll from users.

There are two main justifications for this concession: investors provide upfront funding for projects, alleviating the taxpayers’ burden, and bear the construction, maintenance and commercial risks. VGF grant is provided to make a socially-desirable but unprofitable project attractive for an investor. The underlying objective is not, and should not be, to add to the upfront financing — that is for the private sector to do. Limited funds are available for VGF. The MCA rules allow VGF up to 40% of the project cost; 20% during construction phase and the rest during maintenance phase.

In contrast, the committee has offered the entire grant during construction phase itself, and has reduced
it to a mere cost-sharing device. Further, compared to what would have been possible under the earlier rules, now the grant requirement of fewer projects will be met with. So, at least in the short run, fewer grant-dependent projects will take off.

Besides, an investor can borrow 20% of project cost at concessional rates from the IIFCL, a public sector company. Indeed, excluding the profit margins, an investor can meet up to 70% of cost just using grants and other funds raised by public sector entities. Simply put, what was to be the investor’s responsibility has been passed on to the taxpayer, undermining the rationale of VGF as well as toll contracts. Moreover, an investor is reimbursed 90% of due debt if the contract gets terminated. So, the new rules are likely to create moral hazards during construction phase and later.

Under MCA rules, if actual traffic turns out to be less (greater) than predictions, the concession period is increased (reduced) proportionately. If traffic increases beyond the designed capacity, to avoid congestion, the concessionaire is required to widen the road at his cost. These rules imply that road users get satisfactory service, and the investor and the taxpayer share the unanticipated losses (gains) arising from traffic-risk. In contrast, under the new rules, if the government asks for capacity expansion on account of high traffic, it will have to compensate the investor. Moreover, the contract period cannot be reduced. So, the event of traffic exceeding the designed capacity has become lucrative for the investor. It would ensure them unexpectedly high profit.

Source: economictimes